Washington shifts focus to commerce and security in the Sahel region

The recent diplomatic mission to Mali by Nick Checker, representing the United States State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs, signals a strategic re-entry into the Sahel. Washington is currently implementing a significant policy shift based on three primary pillars: a transition toward trade-centric diplomacy—with a particular focus on the mineral sector—a restructured security approach that reduces permanent military presence, and a move away from humanitarian aid in favor of targeted economic and defense partnerships.

Analysis with Dr. Gnaka Lagoke

Question: Dr. Lagoke, Nick Checker recently held talks with the Malian Foreign Minister and Assimi Goïta in Bamako. How is the current American administration reshaping its foreign policy in the Sahel, and what are its primary objectives in West Africa?

When Mohamed Bazoum was removed from power in Niger, we noticed a clear divergence in strategy. While France was mobilizing military options to reinstate him, the United States adopted a different stance. Even after the new authorities in Niger demanded the withdrawal of American troops and the closure of their bases, Washington refrained from a confrontational military policy. This cautious approach actually began during the previous administration.

Today, within the framework of global competition involving Russia and China, the American establishment has signaled a need to prioritize security and economic interests. This part of Africa is incredibly rich in natural resources. Access to essential minerals is a vital goal for United States foreign policy, much like what we observe in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iran, or Venezuela. The same logic is now being applied to the Sahel states.

Question: Why has Nigeria become a preferred partner in West Africa, especially now that permanent American military bases are no longer active in Niger?

When Donald Trump expressed a desire to assist Nigeria against extremist threats, we saw the United States conduct strikes in northern regions with the local government’s approval. However, many specialists argue that a few bombings cannot fully dismantle militant networks. The true motivation likely lies in Nigeria‘s oil reserves and other valuable resources.

This combination of economic and security interests continues to drive current United States actions. While bases in Niger were vacated, operations have transitioned toward Bénin and Côte d’Ivoire. It is highly probable that this will eventually lead to the establishment of new military facilities in the area.

Question: What benefits can the members of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) expect from collaborating with the United States?

One primary advantage is that Washington is providing a channel for negotiation to the AES nations, whom France and the European Union have largely treated as outcasts. This gives African countries more options in the ongoing geopolitical competition between Western powers and the Brics group.

The United States naturally wants to leverage the friction between these states and the European Union to further its own specific interests. This could be beneficial for the AES if they negotiate effectively, especially since the American narrative now highlights respect for the sovereignty of Mali and its neighbors. This rhetoric is very well-received in the region.

However, some information suggests that certain networks involving France and the United States might still be interested in regime changes in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Whether this is a sincere diplomatic pivot or a strategy of duplicity remains for history to decide.