Rising instability as West African militant groups expand southward

By the numbers

Between 1 January and 28 November 2025:

• Fatalities linked to political unrest exceeded 10,000 in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.
• Extremists abducted 30 international citizens across Mali (22) and Niger (8).
• Data shows a surge in fatalities in Bénin, which rose by nearly 70% compared to the first eleven months of 2024.

During 2025, extremist factions intensified their activities in the central Sahel, posing a significant threat to the military-led governments in the area. Both Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) strengthened their positions in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, while simultaneously pushing their reach into the border zones of Bénin and Nigeria.

A primary tactic in this escalation was economic sabotage, designed to cripple state functions. In Mali, JNIM launched a comprehensive blockade on transport and fuel affecting Nioro du Sahel and Kayes. These coordinated actions stretched across Mopti, Segou, Koulikoro, Sikasso, and Kayes, severing vital trade links to Bamako. The resulting fuel scarcity and price spikes were intended to undermine the military administration’s legitimacy. Consequently, violence in regions like Segou, Sikasso, and Kayes reached unprecedented levels since records began in the late 1990s.

In Burkina Faso, JNIM continued its relentless pressure on the national army and the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP). The group demonstrated a significant leap in tactical ability by briefly capturing the provincial hubs of Diapaga and Djibo in May. Later, in September, a major ambush in Soum province resulted in the deaths of approximately 90 soldiers, marking one of the most significant losses for the Burkinabè military. These maneuvers highlight a clear objective: to destabilize the state by seizing territory and disrupting essential transit corridors.

While Niger has seen less overall violence than its neighbors, it is becoming increasingly susceptible to insurgent movements. Militancy has moved beyond traditional conflict zones into the northern Agadez and southern Dosso regions. ISSP has mirrored JNIM’s economic warfare by targeting the Bénin-Niger oil pipeline near the Nigerian border. Furthermore, the abduction of a United States citizen in Niamey in October serves as a stark reminder that even major urban centers are no longer immune to extremist reach.

Both major groups initiated kidnapping waves targeting foreigners, leading to record-breaking abduction figures in Niger and Mali. JNIM specifically targeted employees of industrial and mining sectors to further their economic goals. ISSP took a broader approach, seizing both laborers and Western nationals, particularly in Niger. This shift indicates a move toward high-value hostage-taking, often involving local criminal syndicates to carry out the operations.

Spreading conflict into coastal West Africa will challenge regional cooperation in 2026

A major shift for the coming year is the emergence of a new strategic front in the borderlands of Nigeria, Niger, and Bénin. This area has become a vital theater for both Sahelian and Nigerian-based armed groups.

Throughout 2025, ISSP and JNIM embedded themselves deeper into this tri-border region. Northern Bénin endured its most violent year on record as JNIM conducted lethal raids from eastern Burkina Faso, including an attack in Park W that claimed the lives of over 50 soldiers. By the middle of the year, the group had pushed further south into the Borgou department. In late October, JNIM also claimed its inaugural strike within Nigeria.

Concurrently, ISSP fortified its presence in southwestern Niger, encroaching on the city of Gaya and maintaining operations in the Nigerian states of Kebbi and Sokoto. Both groups have now successfully established footholds in northwestern Nigeria. This convergence signals a transformative phase where previously separate conflicts are merging into a single, interconnected war zone spanning from Mali to the Nigerian interior. Competition between JNIM, ISSP, Ansaru, and various bandit groups is expected to intensify in these shared spaces during 2026.

As the conflict expands southward, the military juntas in the central Sahel are facing internal crises. In Mali and Burkina Faso, constant insurgent pressure has exposed the fragility of state control. The ongoing blockade in Mali continues to damage the economy and erode the government’s standing with the public. Such persistent disruption could trigger internal military fractures or civilian unrest.

Burkina Faso deals with a similar exhaustion of its security forces. The ability of JNIM to temporarily occupy major towns suggests that even regional capitals like Fada N’Gourma could be at risk. Continued territorial losses and high casualty rates among the VDP and the army may lead to the same political instability that caused previous government collapses.

Despite official promises of security, state authority is fading across the rural Sahel. JNIM and ISSP now effectively govern large areas, imposing taxes and controlling local livelihoods. Their influence is also creeping toward population centers like Tillaberi and Ayorou, proving that no region is entirely safe. Local defense groups, such as the Dozo militias in Mali, are being weakened or forced to negotiate with extremists, leaving communities vulnerable.

The military partnership with Russia has yielded mixed results. While the Africa Corps replaced the Wagner Group, their smaller numbers have struggled to halt militant advances. However, they have recently focused on protecting fuel shipments and supply routes in southern Mali, helping to mitigate the impact of JNIM’s embargo. This logistical support will likely remain a cornerstone for the juntas in 2026 as they attempt to maintain a grip on urban centers.

The intersection of militant expansion, weakened local militias, and declining state legitimacy creates a high risk of political collapse. If the regimes in Burkina Faso or Mali falter, it could trigger a regional chain reaction, leading to further fragmentation and instability across the Sahel and its southern borders in 2026.