The deceptive calm of the Sahel: why silence does not mean stability
The Sahel has largely vanished from global headlines. Over the last few years, the international geopolitical landscape has shifted dramatically. Since 2022, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has pulled European focus toward the East. In 2023, the renewed intensity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict captured the world’s gaze. Meanwhile, the resurgence of rebel activity in the eastern République démocratique du Congo and the disruptive impact of the Trump administration on international norms have dominated the news cycle. Yet, while the world looks elsewhere, the decade-long crises ravaging the Sahel are only intensifying.
Military regimes that seized power during the region’s recent wave of coups promised to wipe out jihadist insurgency. That promise remains unfulfilled. Instead, extremist groups are gaining ground, carrying out increasingly lethal strikes against civilians in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso—the three nations that formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in 2023. Today, the Sahel stands as the global epicenter of jihadist violence.
This security failure is accompanied by a sharp authoritarian turn. Transitions back to constitutional governance and democratic elections have stalled, with timelines being pushed further into the future. Dissent is ruthlessly suppressed as press freedoms vanish. Local and foreign journalists are being silenced, exiled, or intimidated, while civil society groups face constant threats, including arbitrary arrests, forced military conscription, and summary executions.
This analysis examines the recent security and political shifts within the AES countries. It tracks the spread of jihadist influence, evaluates the political climate, and argues for continued engagement by the European Union and its member states, despite their waning influence. Monitoring these regional dynamics is vital to understanding the security risks that could ripple across Africa and beyond.
Persistent instability: the spread of jihadism and local strife
A decade ago, the Sahel recorded the fewest deaths from violent extremism on the continent. By 2024, it became the deadliest region, with fatalities tripling since 2021 to reach 11,200 deaths. This surge in terror coincided with the wave of coups between 2020 and 2023. Notably, these figures do not include the 2,430 civilians killed in 2024 by national security forces and their Russian paramilitary partners. In some instances, state-aligned actors may be responsible for more civilian deaths than the insurgents themselves, leaving populations in a state of total vulnerability.
Mali: a population caught in the crossfire
Following the 2023 expulsion of the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA), the Malian regime, supported by Russian troops, reignited hostilities with Tuareg separatists in the north. The Mali security forces are now fighting a two-front war against both separatists and jihadists, labeling all opposition as “terrorists.”
While the recapture of Kidal in October 2023 bolstered the regime’s claims of sovereignty, it did little to shift the overall balance of power. In July 2024, a tactical collaboration between the CSP-DPA (separatists) and the Al-Qaeda-affiliated JNIM led to a massive defeat for Malian and Wagner Group forces at Tinzaouaten. This ambush resulted in the deaths of roughly 40 Malian soldiers and 80 Russian mercenaries—the heaviest loss for Wagner in the region to date.
By late 2024, jihadist groups demonstrated increased strategic boldness. In September, JNIM launched simultaneous strikes on a gendarmerie school and the military airport in Bamako, killing over 70 security personnel and destroying the presidential aircraft. Unlike the Islamic State in the Sahel, which rules through pure terror, JNIM focused on military targets in an apparent bid to maintain some level of popular support. However, civilians continue to suffer; a drone strike by the Malian army in August 2024 killed over 20 civilians, and a convoy ambush near Gao in early 2025 left 50 dead. Despite this, 2024 surveys suggest many in Mali still express confidence in their military’s “rising power.”
Burkina Faso: state retreat and the rise of militias
Since the 2022 military takeover, Burkina Faso has seen a steady collapse of security. Reports suggest the state has lost control of 60% of its territory, with JNIM operating in 11 of the country’s 13 regions. Fatalities rose by 68% between 2022 and 2023, and 2024 proved even more catastrophic. The August 2024 massacre in Barsalogho was particularly horrific: JNIM militants slaughtered between 130 and 600 people while they were being forced by the army to dig defensive trenches.
State forces have also been implicated in atrocities. Human Rights Watch reported the summary execution of 223 civilians by the army in a single day in February 2024. In March, the VDP (civilian volunteers) were accused of massacring Peul civilians in Solenzo, an ethnic group often unfairly targeted for alleged jihadist ties. This attack, which killed dozens of women and children, prompted a retaliatory strike by JNIM against a military camp in Diapaga.
The regime’s strategy of arming civilians has backfired. Since 2022, Captain Traoré has recruited 50,000 additional VDP members. This mass mobilization, which largely excludes the Peul community, has fueled ethnic tension and turned villages into targets for jihadist raids. Furthermore, political opponents are now being forcibly conscripted into these volunteer ranks. This cycle of violence has created a massive humanitarian crisis, with over 2 million internally displaced persons in Burkina Faso.
Niger: a rapid decline in safety
While Niger was once more stable than its neighbors, the situation has worsened since the 2023 coup. Security forces are now killing three times as many civilians as they did the previous year. In the first nine months of 2024, state forces were attacked 51 times—nearly double the rate of 2023.
Jihadist groups have become more aggressive. In March 2024, 23 soldiers were killed in the Tillabéri region. In December, 39 civilians were murdered near the border with Burkina Faso. The violence continued into 2025, with an Islamic State attack on a mosque in March killing 44 worshippers. Though the regime in Niger appears slightly more stable than those in Mali or Burkina Faso, the security trajectory remains deeply concerning.
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While all three AES states face a growing jihadist threat, their strategies vary. Mali relies on Russian troops to fight both separatists and jihadists. Burkina Faso avoids direct Russian combat involvement, opting instead to arm its own citizens, which has sparked a vicious cycle of communal violence. Niger deals primarily with the Islamic State and uses self-defense militias on a smaller, more controlled scale.
A common trend is the use of high-tech weaponry, including drones and IEDs, by both state and non-state actors. Jihadists generally focus on rural areas to collect “zakat” (taxes) and avoid the risks of occupying major cities—though the Bamako attacks were a notable exception. Recent rumors of “community dialogues” between Malian authorities and JNIM subgroups could signal a potential strategic shift in the region.
The era of permanent transitions
The military leaders of the AES have consistently pushed back election dates and rewritten constitutions to cement their grip on power.
In Mali, the transition originally scheduled to end in 2022 was extended multiple times. Following a “national dialogue” in 2024, the junta suggested staying in power until 2029. Colonel Goïta has since promoted himself to the rank of General of the Army, signaling a long-term hold on the state. Similarly, in Burkina Faso, Captain Traoré declared that elections were no longer a priority, extending his transition until 2029.
Niger followed suit. After avoiding a firm timeline for over 18 months, the regime announced a five-year transition in early 2025. General Tchiani was sworn in as president for a five-year term in March 2025. These prolonged transitions allow the AES to deepen their confederation and solidify new international partnerships, such as the recent military backing promised by Russia.
Authoritarian control of the narrative
Unable to control their borders, the military regimes have instead seized control of the information space. Independent media outlets have been shuttered, and foreign journalists expelled. In Mali, RFI and France 24 were banned in 2022, and the private channel Joliba TV News had its license revoked in 2024. Civil society organizations have been shut down, and political activities suspended.
In Burkina Faso, the crackdown has been equally severe. Media outlets like Jeune Afrique and TV5 Monde have been suspended for critical reporting. In 2025, the regime began placing exiled opponents on “terrorist lists” and kidnapping journalists for forced military service. Niger has also silenced dissent, arresting journalists and keeping former President Mohamed Bazoum in arbitrary detention since the coup.
By controlling the narrative, these regimes present a distorted reality. While Burkina Faso claims to control 70% of its territory, outside researchers suggest the exact opposite is true. For the local population, finding the truth has become nearly impossible.
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The silence surrounding the Sahel is not a sign of peace; it is a product of media repression and Western fatigue. However, the underlying crises—jihadist expansion, record displacement, and extreme hunger—are worsening. By mid-2025, an estimated 52.7 million people in West Africa will face acute food insecurity.
The European Union must recognize that disengaging from the Sahel does not just mean breaking ties with military juntas; it means abandoning the people. As the region opens up to new global partners, Europe must decide what its role will be in a increasingly polarized world. Strengthening solidarity and regional exchanges is the only way to address these global challenges together.
