Over recent weeks, diplomatic efforts have multiplied across West Africa to re-establish dialogue and consultation between ECOWAS member states and those of the Alliance of Sahel States (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger). At the core of these subtle moves lies the security question and the need to implement common policies that harmonise actions, pending the holy grail of pooling resources. To give this urgent diplomacy its best chance, involved actors must observe unspoken requirements: sidestep the dispute over the three AES countries’ withdrawal from ECOWAS; overlook the resentment generated by hostile communication campaigns from AES regimes against certain regional countries; and move beyond the geopolitical restructuring in the Sahel, which has created a Cold War atmosphere between AES and ECOWAS. In short, it is about silencing grudges, overcoming tensions and inappropriate displays of pride, to face the common challenges of the moment.

Côte d’Ivoire ‘ready to resume cooperation’

Among the strong signals of this shift are recent statements by Côte d’Ivoire’s Defence Minister, Tene Birahima Ouattara. On 15 June, he declared himself ‘sincerely ready to resume security cooperation’ with Mali and Burkina Faso, asserting that ‘terrorism, as it currently presents itself, cannot be defeated by a single state. Collaboration and pooling of forces are necessary.’ This obvious truth bears repeating as some decision-makers note that the consequences of the security crisis in the Sahel ‘could become untenable in the medium term’ for the entire region.

How will Mali and Burkina Faso respond to Côte d’Ivoire’s call? Nothing so far suggests a collective surge of clarity from all involved to jointly produce solutions to the stated emergencies. Even if Malian and Burkinabe leaders admit that the break with ECOWAS ‘does not exclude bilateral cooperation’, it is difficult for them to suddenly shift their stance toward the Ivorian interlocutor. Regularly accused of hosting terrorist elements ‘funded’ or ‘sponsored’ by French imperialism, Côte d’Ivoire is a prime target of the AES’s narrative of external—even imaginary—enemies. Although these accusations have never been supported by facts or evidence, they feed the doctrinaire rhetoric of these regimes born from coups that led to their withdrawal from ECOWAS. Yet despite these toxic diplomatic relations, Côte d’Ivoire maintains discreet channels of exchange and cooperation with Mali and Burkina Faso, whose thousands of citizens enjoy refugee status on Ivorian soil.

‘New era’ for Bénin and Niger

Also targeted by these same accusations, Bénin’s new president, Romuald Wadagni, shortly after his inauguration on 24 May, undertook gestures of rapprochement and appeasement toward AES countries. A special mention goes to Niger, whose shared border with Bénin has remained closed since the July 2023 coup in Niamey. With all dialogue having become impossible between the two countries, the arrival of a new leader in Bénin served as an opportunity to end what had turned into a vulgar personal quarrel between Nigerien military authorities and former Béninois President Patrice Talon.

The change at the Béninois presidency has thus accelerated ‘reconciliation’ between these two neighbours. In this spirit, a meeting of Nigerien and Béninois experts was held in Cotonou on 20–21 June to draft terms for renewed cooperation, focusing mainly on defence, security, and conditions for reopening the common border—a decisive factor for resuming economic activities between Bénin and Niger. On this last point, the Nigerien delegation stressed its wish to obtain more information about the alleged presence of ‘foreign elements’ at the Bénin-Niger border. This request echoes the persistent suspicion by the Niamey military regime that Bénin hosts a ‘French military base’ intended to ‘destabilise Niger’ or ‘finance terrorism’. An accusation that defies common sense: why would Bénin finance terrorism when it is itself a target and victim? Such statements are now routine narrative from AES regimes struggling to curb the steady deterioration of security on their territories. Their promise to unite military forces against terrorism has not moved beyond rhetoric. Today, large swathes of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso have become grey zones administered by terrorist armed groups, whose expansion and formidable project the ruling juntas cannot contain.

The hour is thus for reconciliation between Niger and Bénin. According to Niger’s Minister of Interior and Security, Mohamed Toumba, ‘a new era is opening’ for both countries. He stated, ‘By choosing dialogue over confrontation, we have created value for our economies and security for our populations.’ Nigerien and Béninois actors keep in mind that behind the security challenge lies the equally crucial economic one in a space where populations share intertwined destinies. As we witness a return to realist and pragmatic diplomacy, what is unfolding between Bénin and Niger looks like a textbook case or pilot event in the perspective of reassessed, intelligent management of shared vulnerabilities across the West African space.

Endogenous responses to the security crisis

Initiatives aimed at normalising relations between ECOWAS and AES countries should become more defined in the coming months. Besides reactivating the neighbourhood logics that have prevailed in this region for decades, they underscore the urgency of endogenous responses to the security equation. This echoes the recommendations made last year by UN Secretary-General António Guterres for ‘a resumption of dialogue among all West African countries’. In December 2025, Russia—a privileged partner of AES states—issued the first signals of a diplomatic recalibration in West Africa by calling for ‘continued pragmatic and mutually beneficial dialogue between ECOWAS and the AES to find common solutions to common challenges and threats, including the fight against regional terrorism.’ These words indicate a paradigm shift in international cooperation—a way of reminding Africans that it is up to them alone to craft the most efficient solutions to their current challenges.

Already, bilateral relational protocols are observed between the AES and countries such as Ghana, Guinea, Togo, and Senegal. Despite their withdrawal from ECOWAS, the Sahelian military regimes have maintained their membership in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), and their nationals continue to benefit from free movement within the ECOWAS space. Ultimately, one must question the rationale for the promoters of the AES to withdraw from the regional community. The only available answer points back to the initial dispute: ECOWAS’s condemnation of the coups that occurred in AES countries, and above all the refusal of these states’ leaders to work toward a ‘restoration of constitutional order’. In many respects, the rupture between the AES and ECOWAS resembles an artificial or incomplete divorce.