France and Morocco draft friendship treaty for strategic partnership

France and Morocco draft friendship treaty for strategic partnership

The decision by both nations to craft a text grounded in lasting strategic interests signals a shared ambition. It aims to create, with necessary adjustments, an equivalent of the 1963 Élysée Treaty between France and Germany, signed by General de Gaulle and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer.

The joint commission tasked with this work is not empowered to negotiate the treaty itself—that responsibility lies with the two governments—but rather to propose recommendations. These include guiding principles for the partnership, strategic priorities for the 2035–2040 horizon, political dialogue mechanisms, and areas of cooperation in economy, security, military affairs, education, and culture.

A fundamental question arises: why a friendship treaty? It would replace the La Celle-Saint-Cloud agreement signed in France on November 6, 1955, which paved the way for Morocco’s return to independence and the end of the protectorate, formally recognized on March 2, 1956. That agreement allowed Paris to authorize the return of Mohammed V to the throne after his deportation on August 20, 1953.

The current effort seeks to consolidate the achievements of a privileged, even exceptional, cooperation while laying the strategic groundwork for an equal partnership spanning decades to come.

Four main pillars stand out. The first concerns the economy: Paris commits to major investments in Moroccan industrial sectors—automotive, rail, defense, and maritime transport—and to support their modernization through cutting-edge technologies. In return, Rabat pledges preferential access for French companies to major infrastructure projects, along with fiscal incentives.

This treaty would bind France to a non-European Union state, contrasting with Algeria, which has failed to finalize a similar accord for over two decades despite multiple attempts under Presidents Jacques Chirac, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Emmanuel Macron, and Abdelmadjid Tebboune.

The second pillar focuses on security and defense industry cooperation: military technology transfers aimed at making Morocco a regional production hub for light and heavy equipment (aviation, munitions, military vehicles, armored systems), expansion of joint training programs, and enhanced coordination on security and intelligence to address regional challenges, particularly in the Sahel.

The cultural realm constitutes a third, significant pillar: maintaining the privileged position of the French language in the education system, promoting Francophonie without hindering the kingdom’s openness to global business languages like English, facilitating access for Moroccan students to French universities—currently over 42,000—expanding the network of twelve French cultural institutes, and opening new schools, especially in the southern provinces.

The final pillar concerns geopolitics and strategy. It involves Paris’s support for Morocco’s vital interests: backing the autonomy plan for the Sahara, validated by the UN Security Council within the framework of a negotiated settlement (Resolution 2797 of October 31, 2025); support within European Union institutions; and defense of Moroccan interests in sectors such as agriculture and fisheries, as well as various bilateral and multilateral cooperation frameworks.

In return, France hopes to rely on Morocco to participate, in various ways, in new strategic alliances in West Africa, where French influence has waned over the past decade. The goal is to leverage the kingdom’s position as a regional hub.

Ultimately, this treaty carries major symbolic and diplomatic weight. Morocco is emerging as a regional power, an economic hub, and a key player on energy, logistics, and security issues. The treaty could thus serve as a demonstrative and exemplary model: a framework capable of reshaping new forms of cooperation between Europe and Africa.

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