Spain’s PP faces tough choices in relations with Morocco

The accusation levelled at the Spanish Popular Party (PP) by Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares is unusually severe: the opposition is being branded ‘anti-Moroccan’, and the long-standing partnership between Madrid and Rabat has been dragged into domestic political strife.

According to the head of Spanish diplomacy, the PP has turned foreign policy—especially the crucial relationship with Morocco—into a weapon in its fight against the government. The rift deepened after recent declarations by current and former party leaders, prompting Albares to describe the PP as an ‘obstacle’ to Spain’s external agenda.

Yet beneath the political mud-slinging lies a far more consequential reality. Since 2022, Spain and Morocco have built a strategic partnership spanning migration, trade, security and joint organisation of the 2030 FIFA World Cup with Portugal. In December 2025, they cemented this framework with fourteen new cooperation agreements and a joint declaration to deepen political dialogue.

Should the PP win the next election, it would inherit this carefully constructed relationship. The question is whether it would preserve it or dismantle it.

Sahara question exposes PP’s split personality

The Western Sahara issue remains the biggest unknown. When Pedro Sánchez announced in March 2022 that Spain viewed Morocco’s autonomy plan as ‘the most serious, credible and realistic basis’ for a solution, the PP made the shift one of its main lines of attack against the government.

Alberto Núñez Feijóo accused the executive of breaking decades of bipartisan consensus by acting without consulting the main opposition party. Since then, the PP has maintained a deliberately ambiguous stance: its policy documents cite respect for international law and UN resolutions, but stop short of endorsing the same wording used by the government to back Morocco’s plan.

History shows the PP’s position has not always been consistent. During Mariano Rajoy’s premiership, Spain pursued a cautious approach that did not openly oppose Rabat’s proposal. The party itself has sheltered divergent views, from advocates of a strong strategic bond with Morocco to factions closer to separatist positions.

The contradiction became glaring in July 2025 when a self-proclaimed Polisario representative attended the PP’s national congress in Madrid, sparking outrage in Morocco and raising doubts about what Feijóo’s government might do.

By February 2026, the dispute had escalated further. Albares accused the PP of a double game: publicly criticising the government’s Sahara policy while secretly sending ‘emissaries’ to Morocco to push positions they openly rejected at home.

If these claims hold water, the PP’s dilemma is clear. Using the Sahara dispute to weaken Sánchez from the opposition is one thing; reversing Spain’s current Morocco policy once in power would carry heavy diplomatic costs.

International reality has moved on since 2022

The PP would not take office under the same global conditions that existed when Sánchez announced his change of stance. Morocco’s autonomy initiative has since gained broader international backing, and the Sahara question has evolved within the UN framework. Spain, for its part, has embedded its position on the dispute within a much wider bilateral agenda with Rabat.

Reversing course would mean more than rewriting a single line in a diplomatic communiqué. It would reopen one of the most sensitive files in Spanish-Moroccan relations. The PP has yet to give a clear answer: would a Feijóo government uphold Spain’s current Sahara policy or revert to the doctrine in place before March 2022?

Vox’s ‘national priority’ agenda forces PP to adapt

The Sahara is not the only sore point. In recent months, the PP has hardened its rhetoric on immigration and access to certain benefits, driven by stiff electoral competition with Vox.

The turning point came in April 2026 when the concept of ‘national priority’ entered the Spanish debate. Long tied to far-right movements in Europe and championed in Spain by Vox, the idea is to prioritise Spanish nationals over foreigners for certain public services and aid.

The controversy forced the PP to take a stand after Vox pushed the issue in parliament and included it in regional agreements. Internal tensions surfaced, with some party members worried about the legal and political fallout of adopting a slogan so closely linked to the far right.

The PP tried to soften its message. Jaime de los Santos, a senior party figure, stated that ‘any legally resident immigrant enjoys exactly the same rights as those born in Spain’, while other leaders spoke of ‘anchoring’ or ‘residential priority’. But the signal had already been sent: Vox is succeeding in imposing part of its agenda on Spain’s main right-wing party.

The Feijóo paradox: opposition firebrand, potential pragmatist

The central paradox facing the PP is this: from the opposition, it can attack Pedro Sánchez using Morocco and the Sahara as cudgels. In government, it would have to manage one of Spain’s most vital and complex international relationships on a daily basis—and these two roles do not always align.

Cooperation with Morocco is not merely an ideological choice of the PSOE. It is dictated by geography, economics, security needs and a growing web of shared interests. The likeliest scenario is not a rupture but a clash between opposition rhetoric and government action. A PP administration might find itself compelled to preserve the bulk of the current relationship with Rabat, and then explain to its voters why it has not reversed policies it spent years condemning.

The Foreign Minister’s accusation of secret PP emissaries in Morocco points in the same direction: behind closed doors, the party may prove far more pragmatic than its public posture suggests.

The real question is not whether the PP is ‘anti-Moroccan’, as Albares claims. It is how far the main opposition force is willing to weaponise the neighbourly bond for electoral gain, and how much of that rhetoric it would actually translate into state policy if it ever reached La Moncloa.

Spain will remain Morocco’s closest European neighbour, and Morocco will remain an indispensable partner for Madrid—regardless of who sits in power. That is why the PP’s current contradictions matter. If Alberto Núñez Feijóo becomes prime minister, he will not inherit a blank sheet. He will take charge of a profoundly transformed bilateral relationship, a Spanish position on the Sahara embedded in a new international reality, a consolidated security partnership and a 2030 World Cup that will require both countries to collaborate closely in the years ahead.

The choice he faces is stark: turn opposition criticism into government policy and risk plunging relations with Rabat into a new cycle of uncertainty, or acknowledge that the Morocco partnership demands a pragmatism the PP has so far refused to admit in public. That decision could become one of the first major foreign-policy tests for a potential Feijóo government.