Russia’s Africa Corps shifts strategy in Mali

The Russian Africa Corps is strategically repositioning its personnel, withdrawing them from Mali’s northern regions. This tactical shift aims to bolster the security of the capital and the ruling junta, while simultaneously offering crucial aerial assistance and intelligence to Malian forces operating in the field.

Benedict Manzin, a senior analyst for the Middle East and Africa at the UK-based intelligence firm Sybiline, observed that the Russian contingent is “assuming a more supportive role overall.” He further elaborated, “They are making every effort to avoid deploying more individuals into hazardous situations. Their objective is to reduce personnel risk while maximizing their operational impact.”

The Africa Corps took over from the infamous Wagner Group mercenaries around mid-2024. This transition followed a significant setback for Wagner, which saw dozens of its fighters perish in an ambush orchestrated by the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) near Tin Zaouatine, close to the Algerian border, targeting both Wagner and Malian soldiers.

Operating under the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Africa Corps maintains a presence of approximately 2,000 personnel on the ground, many of whom are former Wagner mercenaries. This contingent represents a considerable reduction in size compared to the Wagner force it replaced, and it is roughly half the strength of the French Operation Barkhane counter-terrorism force, which the Malian junta expelled in 2022.

The fall of Kidal in northern Mali to the FLA and the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM) in late April appears to have been a pivotal factor influencing the Africa Corps’ decision to consolidate its presence near its primary base in Bamako.

In response, the Africa Corps initiated retaliatory airstrikes against Kidal, which resulted in widespread infrastructure destruction and displaced numerous residents. These aerial operations were conducted in support of the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa), which have emerged as the dominant ground force in the country’s northern regions.

“We are observing a heavy reliance on air assets,” Manzin stated. He noted that this recently included the deployment of Russian-manufactured cluster bombs against communities in the Kidal region, a move that contravenes Mali’s commitment under the international convention prohibiting the use of such munitions. Manzin elaborated on the Africa Corps’ rationale, saying, “They possess fewer resources to expend. They are unwilling to disperse them among smaller communities in the North where they could be vulnerable.”

An examination of recent Africa Corps statements on social media platforms indicates a clear shift in focus towards central and southern Mali, with the majority of their operations now concentrated near Bamako, according to analyst Jacob Boswall. Following its departure from Kidal, the Africa Corps significantly escalated its propaganda efforts, publishing over 500 articles across Telegram and other channels in the weeks succeeding the defeat.

Beyond aerial assaults, the Africa Corps has also endeavored to circumvent economic blockades imposed by the GSIM in Mali. Africa Corps personnel and air support have begun escorting truck convoys entering the landlocked nation from Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, and Senegal, providing protection against potential GSIM attacks.

Even as the Africa Corps seeks to minimize its direct battlefield exposure, the GSIM has retaliated by employing drones to target Russian personnel at their bases. Recent GSIM videos shared on social media depict drone footage showing Russian fighters killed and Russian aircraft sustaining damage from bombs dropped by drones over their Sévaré base.

In turn, the Africa Corps has launched its own armed drone strikes against GSIM positions in recent weeks, including an attack on a GSIM fuel depot in the Timbuktu region, according to analysts at Africa Terrorism Tracker.

Mali has allocated nearly a billion dollars towards securing the services of the Wagner Group and subsequently the Africa Corps since late 2021. During this period, the Malian government and its Russian allies have seen their control over the North diminish, while the GSIM has expanded its influence across the Sahel. Manzin attributes this partly to the brutal tactics employed by both Russian forces and the FAMa against civilians in the North. He concluded, “The strategy adopted by the Malian state is proving ineffective, and in the long run, the stability of the state itself is jeopardized. Regrettably, the outcome is an increase in GSIM’s power, as communities are inadvertently driven into their embrace.”