Burkina Faso’s delicate path: navigating the political transition
The interpretation of what constitutes a coup d’état frequently shifts, often aligning with the perceived interests and whims of the international community and its neighboring nations. In this context, the “appointment” of Transition President Michel Kafando carried inherent constitutional irregularities. Burkina Faso was poised to operate, for a minimum of twelve months, under a framework of entirely newly established institutions.
Much like assembling a complex construction set, the interim governmental structures gradually took shape. Following the sudden appearance of military uniforms on the public stage, in the aftermath of the hasty departure of the “Sphinx of Kosyam” (Blaise Compaoré), Ouagadougou seemed to reclaim a sense of calm.
Emerging seemingly from obscurity, Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida swiftly occupied the political space, seizing all the prerogatives of a Head of State. His true intentions remained ambiguous. How did he manage to integrate himself among the protestors and political party leaders? Was it not a pre-arranged strategy, perhaps in collaboration between President Blaise Compaoré and General Gilbert Diendéré, to dispatch him to the Place de la Révolution in an attempt to retain control? Regardless, an officer from the Presidential Security Regiment (RSP) publicly championing the cause of the people immediately sparked suspicion and distrust. The initial actions and measures implemented by the military, including the suspension of the Constitution and the dissolution of the National Assembly, fueled fears of an impending junta. It appeared the populace, having sacrificed and shed blood, might be robbed of their victory.
As is often its practice, the African Union promptly threatened to ostracize Burkina Faso. Simultaneously, a delegation of ECOWAS heads of state – including John Dramani Mahama of Ghana, Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria, and Macky Sall of Sénégal – converged to gauge the intentions of the military leadership and press them to moderate their stance. The precedents set by Captains Daddis Camara in Guinea and Sanogo in Mali undoubtedly prompted the Burkinabé officers to reconsider their options. They understood that seizing power by force would no longer go unpunished, and a protracted crisis resolution process risked isolating the nation and incurring escalating public disapproval.
Ultimately, the army negotiated a compromise solution, formally outlined in the Transition Charter. The agreement stipulated that the executive branch of the transition would be led by a civilian president, while the military would maintain significant influence over the government. Concurrently, a 90-member legislative body, the National Transition Council (CNT), was established to accommodate those who had spearheaded the struggle. A Designation Committee, comprising about twenty members, was tasked with the crucial responsibility of naming a Transitional President. This arrangement constituted a fixed-term contract, set to conclude in November 2015, coinciding with the original end date of President Blaise Compaoré’s mandate.
For the selection of the Head of State, each vital component of the nation’s active forces – including the army, civil society, opposition parties, and religious and traditional authorities – was required to submit a shortlist within a specified timeframe. In the end, five individuals were shortlisted:
- The opposition and civil society nominated two journalists: Newton Ahmed Barry, who edits the weekly newspaper L’Evènement, and Chériff Sy Moumina, publishing director of the weekly Bendré. Their legitimacy stemmed from their media outlets’ consistently critical stance against the former regime.
- The military presented a more diverse range of candidates: a clergyman, Archbishop Mgr Ouédraogo of Bobo Dioulasso; a diplomat, Michel Kafando; and a woman, former minister Joséphine Ouédraogo. Early on, Archbishop Ouédraogo, initially a strong contender, publicly withdrew his interest, preferring to focus on his current ecclesiastical duties.
The remaining two candidates held a distinct advantage over the others: their extensive experience within prominent international institutions. Madame Joséphine Ouédraogo had previously served with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), while Michel Kafando had twice represented his country at the UN headquarters in New York, first between 1981 and 1982, and again from 1998 to 2011. In the “Land of the Upright People,” an unspoken divide often separates individuals into pro- or anti-Sankara camps. This implicit ideological split has historically influenced the political trajectories of many public figures. Joséphine Ouédraogo served as Minister of Family Development and Solidarity from 1984 to 1987. Michel Kafando, on the other hand, held the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of Prime Minister Thomas Sankara, under President Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo in 1982. The two men reportedly experienced disagreements regarding the conduct of Upper Volta’s diplomacy and held fundamentally opposing ideologies.
A career within an international institution provides a dual benefit: a significant boost to one’s curriculum vitae and an invaluable network of contacts. This proved to be a disadvantage for the two aspiring journalists put forward by the opposition.
For a limited period, Michel Kafando, the retired diplomat, would be compelled to set aside his cattle and poultry farming in Saponé for a greater purpose: to safeguard the nation in crisis. He would concurrently hold the Presidency of the Transition and the portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs. This dual role streamlined diplomatic interactions, providing a single point of contact for international partners and circumventing direct engagement with head of government Isaac Zida.
The unfolding situation in Burkina Faso was closely monitored by several international capitals: Accra, which currently presided over ECOWAS; Addis Ababa, home to the African Union; and Paris and Washington, due to their geopolitical interests. On the day of Michel Kafando’s inauguration, numerous Heads of State – from Mauritania (representing the AU), Ghana (ECOWAS), Togo, Bénin, Mali, and Niger – traveled to attend, signaling a re-acceptance of Burkina Faso into the regional fold. However, questions lingered as to whether this significant representation truly legitimized the reinstatement of a Constitution that had been suspended just weeks prior. The United States, guided by its principle of non-cooperation with unelected Heads of State, faced a dilemma with the current situation in Burkina Faso. Consequently, the international community orchestrated a strategy to “normalize” the coup d’état and establish a constitutional substitute. This ensured the continued presence of American reconnaissance aircraft in Ouagadougou, as the United States relies on Mauritania and Burkina Faso as crucial bases for monitoring the Sahel region.
Of the 26 ministerial positions, the military secured four critical portfolios: the Prime Minister also assumed the Ministry of Defense; Colonel Auguste Denise Barry, a former Security Minister in 2011, was entrusted with Territorial Administration, Decentralization, and Security (MATDS); Colonel David Kabré, spokesperson for Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida, was appointed to Sports; and Boubacar Ba took charge of the highly strategic Ministry of Mines and Energy. Joséphine Ouédraogo was assigned the position of Keeper of the Seals – perhaps as a compensatory role – while Augustin Loada, a university lecturer and prominent civil society figure, was named to the Public Service. Adama Sagnon, who inherited the Ministry of Culture, resigned merely days after his appointment, facing intense pressure from civil society groups who criticized his past handling of the Norbert Zongo case as a former prosecutor.
The National Transition Council (CNT), the interim legislative body, elected Chériff Sy Moumina, one of the unsuccessful candidates for the transitional presidency, as its president, securing 71 out of 90 votes from his peers. The next crucial steps involve establishing and completing the institutions and mechanisms necessary to guide Burkina Faso toward transparent and equitable elections, including the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), a new electoral code, and relevant organic laws.
What are the missions for this brief transitional period?
Since early December, Michel Kafando has signed the presidential decree establishing the National Reconciliation and Reforms Commission (CRNR). The scope of this body and the duration of its mandate remain key considerations. More than 27 years after the assassination of Thomas Sankara, the “Land of the Upright People” finally aimed to embark on a process of catharsis. Immediately following his appointment, one of President Michel Kafando’s initial decisions was to authorize investigations to identify Thomas Sankara’s remains. Prime Minister Isaac Zida also played a role, announcing that the file concerning President Thomas Sankara’s assassination would be “fully opened” and that, if necessary, Burkina Faso would seek the extradition of former President Blaise Compaoré from Morocco.
Through a series of significant public announcements, the current leaders effectively opened a Pandora’s Box. Such sensitive cases typically demand an extended period for resolution, likely surpassing the duration of the transition. Were these declarations primarily intended to reassure opponents of the Blaise Compaoré regime? As Minister of Defense, army reform should have been Isaac Zida’s foremost priority. In this regard, General Gilbert Diendéré – Blaise Compaoré’s special chief of staff and thus Isaac Zida’s direct hierarchical superior – was relieved of his duties by President Michel Kafando. He was replaced by Commander Théophile Nikièma, a former head of the “Operations and Instruction” Bureau of the RSP and also the director of External Documentation, essentially the intelligence service of the Kosyam palace.
The question of loyalty between Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida and Commander Théophile Nikièma towards General Gilbert Diendéré remains pertinent. Burkina Faso successfully de-escalated the political crisis that began on October 30, which led to Blaise Compaoré’s downfall, with minimal major incidents. The intervention of RSP elements during the initial clashes could easily have triggered a civil war. Would it not be more prudent to concentrate on organizing elections rather than potentially implicating General Gilbert Diendéré and other living civilian and military figures by reviving the Sankara dossier?
How can a witch hunt be prevented? Two general directors of major national enterprises, perceived as closely associated with the ousted president’s family, have already been dismissed: Jean-Baptiste Bérehoundougou from Société Nationale Burkinabè des Hydrocarbures (SONABHY) and Jean Christophe Ilboudo from Société Nationale Burkinabè d’Electricité (SONABEL). While an act of contrition does not fully absolve past transgressions, it contributes to fostering reconciliation; this was the recent approach taken by Gilbert Noël Ouédraogo of the Alliance for Democracy and Federation – African Democratic Rally (ADF-RDA), a political party affiliated with the former presidential movement. Similarly, the nation paid tribute to the seven individuals who tragically lost their lives during the events of October 30 and 31, now laid to rest in the Gounghin cemetery.
Will the CRNR endure beyond the conclusion of the transitional period? With all the transitional institutions now established, political figures and parties are poised to take center stage. Notably, no prominent political heavyweights chose to occupy seats within either the Executive or the CNT; this effectively bars them from running in the upcoming general elections. Presidential candidates are already in the starting blocks. The creation of the CNT also prompted the CFOP, the opposition coalition, to self-dissolve. The electoral contest is certainly anticipated to commence in early 2015.
