After three years of relentless conflict, the Sudanese war has now spilled across the border into Chad. Cross-border strikes, rising military tensions and deepening communal divisions are forcing N’Djamena to confront a crisis it can no longer ignore.
Three years of war in Sudan between General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, widely known as Hemedti, have taken a dangerous regional turn. Despite Chad’s official stance of neutrality, its de facto support for the RSF has exposed the country to severe backlash. This support places N’Djamena in a precarious position: backing a faction that has been accused of targeting Zaghawa communities in Darfur, a group that also forms the backbone of Chad’s own state apparatus. Arms shipments, reportedly financed by the United Arab Emirates, have reportedly transited through eastern Chadian cities such as Amdjarass and Adré, a risky gambit whose consequences were predictable and now loom large.
Tiné: the epicenter of cross-border tensions
Two towns share the name Tiné—one in Sudan, one in Chad. These twin settlements are home to the same Zaghawa populations and serve as a critical crossing point for civilians fleeing the horrors of war in North Darfur. On February 21, 2026, the RSF seized control of the Sudanese side of Tiné, immediately clashing with Toroboro fighters—Chadian and Sudanese combatants aligned with General al-Burhan—as well as Chadian soldiers who intervened without official authorization. These clashes led to a rapid recapture of the town. In response to the deteriorating security situation, Chad announced the closure of its border with Sudan. Yet fighting continued unabated, underscoring the entrenched nature of the conflict in this transborder zone.
Against this volatile backdrop, a deadly drone strike struck Tiné in Chad on March 21, killing nearly two dozen civilians. While Chadian authorities deny involvement, accusations have mounted. Exiled opposition leader Ousmane Dillo, currently based in Sudan, released an audio message widely circulated on private messaging platforms, directly accusing Mahamat Déby and calling for his removal. Dillo also alleged that the Chadian president is endangering the Zaghawa community. From Sudan, Minni Arkou Minawi, Governor of Darfur, escalated rhetoric further by declaring that “the war with Chad has already begun,” signaling a dangerous regional escalation.
National security on high alert
Chadian authorities have responded with unyielding firmness. Government spokesperson Gassim Chérif Mahamat reiterated Chad’s neutrality while vowing a “proportionate” response to any attacks. President Mahamat Déby has since ordered the country’s armed forces onto maximum alert. On March 22, a high-level security summit convened in Tiné, bringing together top military officials to reinforce border protection and prevent further destabilization. “This is Tiné, Chad—not Tiné, Sudan. Let the Sudanese army, the Toroboros, and the RSF fight it out in their own country. They must not bring their war here to kill our people,” declared General Ali Ahmat Akhabach, Minister of Security.
In a move with dire humanitarian consequences, N’Djamena has since barred civilians from crossing the border, effectively preventing women and children fleeing Sudan’s brutal war from reaching safety in Chadian refugee camps. This decision, ostensibly aimed at preventing Zaghawa rebellion, is unlikely to improve security. Regional analyst Cameron Hudson warned: “Chad’s military buildup along the Sudanese border amid rising tensions risks drawing Chad deeper into the Sudanese conflict rather than keeping it out. Déby’s attempt to project strength may prove a costly strategic misstep.”
Community fractures deepen as war spreads
The spillover from Sudan’s war is not limited to the Zaghawa. According to Chadian security sources, the RSF has been actively recruiting young men from the Tama community in recent weeks. This mobilization resembles mercenary activity and appears to be coordinated through local networks involving traditional leaders, administrative authorities and figures close to the government.
Like the Zaghawa, the Tama are a transborder community, present in both eastern Chad (Wadi Fira, Ouaddaï) and western Sudan. Although non-Arab, during the initial Darfur conflict in 2003, they were integrated into the Janjaweed militias—the predecessors of Hemedti’s forces—and participated in attacks against ethnic groups, including the Zaghawa. This resurgence of old tensions is deeply concerning, as it risks reigniting communal fractures within Chadian society and fueling a climate of mutual suspicion and fear.
What was once a murky strategic calculation has now become a dangerous slippery slope. Chad’s leadership finds itself trapped in an escalation it may no longer control. The genie is out of the bottle—and it will not go back in.
