The Sahel: escalating crisis fuels debate on negotiating with jihadist groups

Following the coordinated assaults on April 25 and 26 across Bamako, Kati, Gao, Sévaré, and Kidal, a long-standing taboo topic has re-entered Mali’s security discourse: should discussions be initiated with jihadist organizations? Given the significant scale of the offensive, jointly executed by Jnim (Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin), an Al-Qaïda affiliate, and the Tuareg rebels of the Front de libération de l’Azawad (FLA), numerous analysts and observers now contend that a purely military approach has reached its limits.

The offensive has spread with unprecedented speed throughout Mali, from its northern to southern regions. Armed factions launched multiple synchronized attacks targeting military forces and symbols of authority in at least six cities, reaching the outskirts of Bamako. For the first time, Jnim and the FLA visibly operated in concert. Established in November 2224 after the dissolution of the Cadre stratégique permanent (CSP), the FLA advocates for the self-determination of Azawad, a vast territory in northern Mali.

These recent attacks starkly highlighted the Malian regime’s vulnerability. Neither Assimi Goïta’s junta nor its Russian allies from Africa Corps appear capable of halting the advance of these armed groups. Across regional media and diplomatic circles, the prospect of negotiations with Jnim is now being openly discussed, against a backdrop of Bamako’s gradual suffocation and regional entrenchment. Despite this, the junta publicly dismisses any notion of dialogue, asserting its exclusion of “any discussion with armed terrorist groups” and maintaining a strictly military stance, even as the security situation rapidly deteriorates.

Since late April, pressure on the regime has been relentless, with violence escalating in the country’s central regions. Just recently on Friday, several villages in the Bankass area, including Kouroude and Dougara, were subjected to attacks. Local and security sources indicate a combined death toll ranging from 70 to 80 for the Wednesday and Friday assaults.

an unprecedented alliance, a stark warning

Jnim remains the primary driver of jihadist activity across the Sahel, particularly in Mali, but also extending to Burkina Faso and Niger. For the military juntas, united under the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES), the situation is becoming increasingly dire. These regimes seized power with promises to restore security, yet they struggle to contain a threat that continues to expand. In Mali, attacks have been drawing relentlessly closer to the capital for nearly a year.

« Since July 2025, jihadists have conducted attacks in western Mali, targeting gold mining and industrial sites. They then focused on the Bamako-Dakar corridor, effectively suffocating the capital, » observes Alain Antil, director of the Sub-Saharan Africa Centre at Ifri. « This time, what is striking is not just the operation’s scale, but also the deliberate choice of targets. Kati and Bamako represent the regime’s very core, » analyzes Héni Nsaibia of Acled.

The demise of Defense Minister Sadio Camara in Kati profoundly shook the government. Concurrently, the loss of Kidal – which was recaptured in late 2023 and heralded as a significant victory – represents a major strategic setback.

the strategy of asphyxiation

Even prior to this recent offensive, several experts had noted an evolution in Jnim’s strategy. « There is a clear intent to establish a more dominant power dynamic, not only through security pressure but also to compel Malian authorities into negotiations, » Alain Antil had previously explained.

The jihadist group now aims to replicate nationally what it had been testing locally: economic blockades, the gradual encirclement of urban centers, and pressure on crucial logistical routes. « Jnim is attempting to maintain an economic blockade around Bamako, » emphasizes the researcher.

For Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa, this tactic is a long-term endeavor: « They have opted to weaken the government from within, prioritizing a strategy of attrition and exploiting the military system’s existing fragilities. » He adds: « Jnim no longer insists on the application of Sharia law as a prerequisite for peace and now expresses openness to negotiation. »

Within this complex landscape, the rivalry with the État islamique au Grand Sahara (EIGS) introduces an additional layer of instability, as each group strives to expand its territorial control and influence.

a taboo option gaining traction

Officially, Sahelian regimes reject any notion of dialogue. « For the leaders of the AES, political negotiation is not under consideration. The discourse remains assertive, with military response as the sole option, » notes Alain Antil.

However, on the ground, the situation is far more intricate. Atrocities committed by state forces and their allies have severely eroded public trust. Between January 2024 and March 2025, nearly 1,500 civilians were killed by government forces and their Russian partners in Mali, a figure almost five times higher than those killed by Jnim, according to the GI-TOC. This violence fuels resentment and inadvertently aids jihadist recruitment efforts.

States must commit to a brave compromise.

Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa, Sahel researcher

Faced with this deadlock, an increasing number of experts advocate for a paradigm shift. « A military-only approach is a dead end against the jihadist phenomenon in the Sahel. It must be combined with political negotiations, » asserts Alain Antil of Ifri. Certain demands articulated by jihadist groups – such as addressing corruption, seeking justice, and ensuring access to resources – could form a basis for discussion, without overlooking their violent tactics.

Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa goes further: « States must resolve to a brave compromise. The idea would be to integrate jihadists into the political arena to expose their limitations. » Yet, he sets clear boundaries: « The principle of gender equality and the secular nature of the state are non-negotiable. »

As jihadist offensives continue to advance, the concept of negotiation is transitioning from an anathema to a plausible political strategy. For many experts in Mali, the real question is no longer whether dialogue is necessary, but rather how much longer Bamako can afford to resist it.