Benin’s opposition challenges government on Niger military intervention

Following the military coup in Niger on July 26, 2023, international responses were swift. Major organizations such as CEDEAO, the AU, and nations like the USA, France, and Russia quickly articulated their positions. Within Bénin, President Patrice Talon‘s involvement and the discussions surrounding a potential armed intervention have met with considerable dissent. Western media reports suggest Bénin might commit troops alongside CEDEAO forces to confront the military junta. Numerous stakeholders, including the Catholic Church and political figures, have openly declared that a military approach is not the optimal solution, instead advocating for diplomatic engagement to resolve the crisis.

Elected representatives from the opposition party, « Les Démocrates », have directly questioned the government’s stance, submitting a comprehensive set of 19 urgent inquiries. Their primary concern revolves around the justification for Bénin’s military involvement, particularly when considering the historically fraternal ties between Bénin and Niger. They have also voiced apprehension regarding adherence to the Beninese constitution, the safety of deployed troops, and the potential for conflict escalation, along with its ramifications for civilian populations and Bénin itself.

Beyond military considerations, significant economic and diplomatic concerns have also been brought to the forefront. The decision to close borders with Niger could lead to substantial repercussions for the Autonomous Port of Cotonou and the broader Beninese economy, which is already grappling with CEDEAO sanctions. In light of rising prices for essential goods and the negative impact on economic operators, the opposition demands concrete answers from the government.

Dialogue is emerging as the preferred solution for several regional and international actors. The opposition lawmakers have reminded Patrice Talon of his own advocacy for dialogue as an alternative to coups d’état, urging him to implement such an inclusive dialogue within Bénin. The current period calls for careful consideration, critical questioning, and, above all, the pursuit of peaceful and consensual resolutions for the region’s future.

Oral Questioning with Debate for the Government

On July 26, 2023, a military coup in Niger abruptly ended the constitutional mandate of President Mohamed Bazoum. This event triggered reactions from various global states and sub-regional and regional organizations, including CEDEAO, the AU, and the UN. On Thursday, August 10, 2023, the Heads of State and Government of CEDEAO member countries convened an extraordinary summit. During this summit, decisions were made, notably the directive to deploy the CEDEAO standby force to restore constitutional order in the Republic of Niger.

In response, the government of Bénin, through its official statements, has declared its intention to commit Beninese troops to the CEDEAO contingent tasked with confronting the military junta. Given this governmental choice to involve the Beninese state in a potential conflict against the fraternal and sovereign people of Niger, a decision perceived as violating Article 101 of our constitution, and acknowledging the severe economic, social, and security impacts already resulting from the sanctions imposed by the CEDEAO Heads of State conference on July 30, 2023, in Abuja, the National Assembly, in accordance with Article 108 and its subsections of its internal regulations, calls upon the government to address the following concerns:

1. What measures has the government taken to seek parliamentary approval regarding the deployment of Beninese troops in the CEDEAO operational theater in Niger, should the military option be implemented, in compliance with Article 101, paragraph 1, of our constitution, which states: « a declaration of war is authorized by the National Assembly »?
2. In anticipation of this potential conflict against the sovereign people of Niger, several nations, such as France and the United States, have arranged for the evacuation of their citizens from Niger. What provisions has the government of Bénin made for its citizens residing in Niger?
3. Given that Bénin and Niger share a fraternal bond, what justifies Bénin’s willingness to send its troops to attack Niger, while other CEDEAO countries not bordering Niger decline to participate?
4. What is the projected number of Beninese soldiers and the essential logistics the government intends to provide to the CEDEAO contingent? What is the estimated cost of Bénin’s potential participation in this operation? Who will bear these expenses?
5. In the event of an aggression against the sister nation of Niger, can our government guarantee that no lives of Nigerien civilians or our own soldiers will be lost?
6. What provisions has the government made for each soldier in terms of bonuses, and for each soldier’s family in the tragic event of a Beninese soldier’s death during operations?
7. As a country bordering Niger, what assurance can the government provide that, in the event of retaliation by the Nigerien army, no casualties will occur on Beninese soil?
8. Can the government reassure the public that, in the event of war with Niger, potential jihadists will not exploit the situation to infiltrate our country, as observed in Libya?
9. Would it not be wiser to prioritize political and diplomatic dialogue, as was the case in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea?
10. Is it not possible for Bénin to lead, as it has in the past within CEDEAO, in preventing coups d’état by actively combating electoral exclusions, the imprisonment, and exile of political opponents?
11. Why is CEDEAO more eager to react against military coups d’état while tolerating institutional coups, as witnessed in Côte d’Ivoire in 2020, Guinea in 2021, and Bénin in 2019, 2020, and 2021, among other countries?
12. Is the restoration of President Mohamed Bazoum’s power more valuable than the lives of thousands of Nigerien civilians and CEDEAO contingent soldiers who might perish?
13. What would become of Niger after such a conflict?
14. The populations within the CEDEAO zone no longer trust our organization, which they describe as a