The morning of 9 October 2026 brought a fresh round of bloodshed to the Tessit area, a stretch of land hugging the Burkina Faso border, where fighters from the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Sahel (IS-S) turned their weapons on each other. The immediate question of who won matters less than the uncomfortable truth the fighting lays bare: armed organisations continue to contest territory across the Sahel, and the military governments that promised to end this war are struggling to make their promises stick.
What really happened at Tessit and why the accounts don’t add up
Accounts circulating after the clashes paint two irreconcilable pictures. Sources aligned with JNIM insist the rival faction suffered heavy losses on multiple fronts. Those close to IS-S counter that JNIM was routed and that new ground was seized. Neither narrative can be independently verified, and both are designed to project strength rather than inform.
What the competing claims do reveal is a pattern that has become familiar across the region: armed groups retain the capacity to organise, manoeuvre and fight one another, while civilians bear the cost. Families in the area face displacement, disrupted livelihoods and the constant threat of being caught in the crossfire of a conflict they did not choose.
The structural problem the juntas cannot afford to ignore
These events throw into sharp relief a contradiction at the heart of the security narrative advanced by the military regimes in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger the three states that make up the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). Since taking power, their leaders have staked their legitimacy on reclaiming sovereignty and defeating terrorism. Yet the persistence of armed groups, their freedom of movement, their ability to coordinate and their willingness to fight each other all point to a deeper problem that speeches alone cannot solve.
The issue is not simply that terrorist organisations exist. It is that states have struggled to prevent them from putting down roots. Tessit is a case in point: while two organisations battle for position, local populations continue to endure insecurity that shows no sign of lifting, despite repeated pledges to restore order.
AES authorities regularly point the finger at foreign interference, accusing neighbouring countries of facilitating armed group activity or allowing their territory to be used as rear bases. Such claims deserve scrutiny, but they require verifiable evidence. The mere presence of terrorist groups on a country’s soil does not prove that its leaders are harbouring or supporting them.
The unavoidable question remains: how can military governments justify their security record when armed groups keep operating in areas where the state has failed to establish lasting authority?
Sovereignty rhetoric versus what is actually happening on the ground
For the Sahel’s military rulers, the central challenge is now to show that their strategic choices yield tangible results. Switching military partners, expelling Western forces and deepening ties with Russia were presented as the path to regaining control. But these shifts, on their own, have not eliminated armed groups.
Ongoing difficulties in Mali and violence across various parts of the Sahel serve as a reminder that counter-terrorism depends on intelligence, an effective administrative presence, civilian protection and the ability of security forces to hold recaptured territory.
A 2026 United Nations report described sustained activity by JNIM and the Islamic State in the Sahel, particularly around Tessit and Ménaka in Mali, as well as in parts of Niger and Burkina Faso. It also documented clashes between these organisations over territorial control.
This reality undercuts narratives that frame every security setback as the product of external manipulation. Regional and cross-border factors are real, but they do not absolve any government of accountability for its own outcomes.
The political dimension: insecurity as a justification for staying in power
Managing the terrorist threat raises a broader political question: how can a country avoid allowing persistent insecurity to become a permanent excuse for concentrating power and delaying a return to constitutional order?
It would be reckless to assert, without evidence, that AES leaders deliberately harbour or nurture terrorist groups in order to cling to power. Such an accusation demands concrete, independent and verifiable proof.
It is, however, entirely legitimate to examine the political consequences of a situation in which the security threat remains omnipresent while military authorities continue to cite counter-terrorism as a primary justification for their rule.
The distinction matters: pointing out the potential political exploitation of insecurity is not the same as claiming that leaders manufacture that insecurity. The first is political analysis; the second requires evidence.
What people actually want and what they are still waiting for
In Tessit, the opposing claims from JNIM and the Islamic State make it impossible to determine with certainty which side prevailed on 9 October. But that uncertainty does not alter the fundamental issue: these organisations remain capable of mounting operations and challenging control over certain areas.
For residents, the consequences are tangible. Insecurity restricts movement, disrupts economic activity and makes access to essential services harder. Talk of sovereignty, international alliances and external enemies cannot indefinitely substitute for measurable results on the ground.
The governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger therefore face a straightforward demand: demonstrate the ability to protect civilians, prevent armed groups from establishing a lasting presence and restore effective public authority in affected areas.
Sovereignty is not measured solely by the partners a country chooses or the foreign forces it expels. It is also measured by a state’s capacity to protect its citizens on its own territory.
As long as armed groups continue to fight over territory in the Sahel, AES authorities will have to answer a question that no amount of rhetoric can dodge: beyond speeches and accusations aimed outward, what durable results can they show to guarantee the safety of the people they govern?
By Harouna Ousmane — Journaliste / Rédacteur