In just over two months, the president of Senegal will possess a constitutional weapon that has been off-limits until now: the dissolution of the National Assembly. With a parliament controlled by Pastef and an executive now backed by its own party, the country is approaching a pivotal date. This analysis breaks down the timeline, the options on the table, their financial implications, and what each side stands to gain or lose.

The date is no coincidence. Article 87 of the Constitution allows the head of state to dissolve the National Assembly once the first two years of the legislature have elapsed. The current Assembly, dominated by Ousmane Sonko’s Pastef, was elected in November 2024 and installed its bureau on December 2, 2024. Therefore, December 2, 2026, marks the first day dissolution becomes legally possible.

The context, however, has radically changed since the installation of this fifteenth legislature. Since his break with Ousmane Sonko’s Pastef on May 22, 2026, the president no longer holds a parliamentary majority. The former prime minister now leads the Assembly, while the president has formed a new government and launched his own party, Kiiraay. Senegal is thus experiencing an unprecedented form of cohabitation, in which the head of state and the parliamentary majority come from the same movement but no longer share the same agenda.

What the president says, and what his allies say

Officially, nothing is decided. Speaking in New York, Bassirou Diomaye Faye downplayed speculation, noting that “we are not yet at December 2” and that no date had been set for a dissolution or elections. He has, however, never ruled it out.

Among his entourage, the tone is far less cautious. In mid-August, Trade Minister Serigne Guèye Diop announced that Senegal was heading toward new legislative elections, accusing lawmakers from the parliamentary majority of “sabotaging” the president’s agenda. He specifically criticized Pastef elected officials for systematically rejecting initiatives from the presidential palace. Between the president’s caution and the eagerness of some ministers, suspense is maintained—and it likely serves the presidential strategy: the threat of dissolution weighs on parliamentary debates long before it becomes reality.

If the president signs the decree in the first days of December, the country would embark on a rapid legislative campaign. The Constitution sets the timeframe, with a vote to be organized between sixty and ninety days after dissolution, placing the new legislative elections between late January and early March 2027. The 2024 precedent gives an idea of the pace: dissolved on September 12, the Assembly was renewed by November 17.

This timeline, however, collides with another deadline. Prime Minister Ahmadou Al Aminou Lo has announced that territorial elections will be held on January 17, 2027. Two national votes just weeks apart would pose a serious logistical and political problem. A potential “coupling” of the two elections, mentioned by some officials, faces legal hurdles. Dissolution could therefore lead, indirectly, to a reshuffling of the local election calendar—a prospect civil society is already watching closely.

The status quo scenario: cohabitation under strain

The other option is to do nothing, at least for now. Dissolution is a right, not an obligation, and the president could choose to let the legislature run its course. But this status quo would come at a price: governing with an Assembly that is no longer aligned. The first test is already here. The revised finance law, tied to the IMF agreement, was received by the National Assembly on September 18, and Ousmane Sonko has publicly demanded clarifications on the content of the IMF deal and on debt treatment. The 2027 budget will follow.

In this scenario, every major bill would become a tug-of-war. The president has already framed the debate by calling on everyone to assume their responsibilities and stating that the people will arbitrate. The status quo would not be peace, but a war of position, with the January territorial elections becoming the first judge.

The financial question is not a detail in a country negotiating with its lenders and seeking to contain its debt. The 2024 precedent offers a reliable basis for calculation. During the vote on that year’s revised finance law, the finance minister estimated the cost of organizing the snap legislative elections of November 17, 2024, at 20 billion CFA francs. Electoral materials alone weigh heavily: with 41 competing lists, the Interior Ministry spent over 11 billion CFA francs on printing ballots and campaign documents. For comparison, the total cost of the March 2024 presidential election was around 14 billion CFA francs.

A new dissolution would therefore require spending at least 20 billion, on top of the cost of the territorial elections. The debate has already begun within the presidential camp itself, where a Kiiraay departmental official in Kaolack has come out against holding the local vote immediately, calling the public expenditure irresponsible given social urgencies.

What Diomaye Faye and Kiiraay stand to gain or lose

For the head of state, a successful dissolution would be the only way to regain a majority and govern without hindrance until the end of his term. That is the whole point of Kiiraay, launched in July to structure his majority durably and prepare for upcoming elections, notably the local elections planned for 2027.

The risk, however, is considerable. The party is barely two months old and has never faced the polls. A defeat in the legislative elections would leave the president facing an Assembly re-legitimized by the ballot—and therefore even more hostile—for the rest of his term. This is what makes the January territorial elections so strategic: they can serve as a barometer before playing the dissolution card, or conversely reveal a weakness that would make it suicidal.

Pastef starts from a dominant position, with 130 of 165 seats won in 2024. In a snap election, the party has mathematically almost nothing to gain in seats and much to lose. But the stakes lie elsewhere. A clear victory after the break would validate the thesis of its activists, who accuse the president of betraying the project, and would make Ousmane Sonko the true political center of gravity in the country.

Sonko’s party is not mistaken. At the very moment the president launched Kiiraay, the National Assembly president was leading a national tour dedicated to the campaign to sell PASTEF membership cards. Each camp is preparing for an electoral battle, whether the date is set in January or later.

For the formations crushed in 2024, a reshuffle would be a boon. The division of the former majority opens unprecedented space, and a snap election would offer the opposition a chance to regain parliamentary representation worthy of the name. It will nevertheless have to choose its positioning vis-à-vis two blocs that both claim the legacy of the 2024 break. A tactical alliance with one camp or the other could become the key to the next election.

Ultimately, December 2 does not mark the day of a decision, but the moment when all options become possible. The president can dissolve from that day, wait for the verdict of the territorial elections, or keep the threat in reserve as a means of pressure on lawmakers. Until then, the examination of the revised finance law and the 2027 budget will say much about the climate between the two heads of the former tandem. One thing seems certain: 2027 will open under the sign of the ballot box, and that may be where the real arbitration between Diomaye Faye and Ousmane Sonko will play out.