When Niger’s military government moved to reclaim its uranium sector after the July 2023 coup, it set off a chain of events that few outside the industry fully anticipated. The break with Orano, the French giant that had operated in the country for over half a century, was never going to be a simple divorce. It has become a slow, layered restructuring of an entire industry — and a test of whether political sovereignty can be converted into commercial leverage.
The central question remains unanswered: is Niger actually selling its uranium on better terms today? The available evidence suggests a more complicated picture. Niamey’s bargaining power has clearly grown, yet no public data confirms that the country consistently commands higher prices. And several confidential negotiations have surfaced — though none has yet been proven to result in a binding, executed contract.
A sovereignty push that outran industrial reality
The rupture with Orano was not merely diplomatic. It reshaped the financial and operational foundations of Niger’s uranium sector.
Orano lost operational control of its Nigerien activities in December 2024, before the Somaïr mine at Arlit was nationalised on 19 June 2025. The French group, which held 63.4% of Somaïr against the Nigerien state’s 36.6%, disputes the move and has launched multiple international arbitration proceedings.
The core difficulty for Niamey is that controlling a mine does not automatically create a market for its output.
Nigerien production has fallen sharply over the past decade, dropping from 4,116 tonnes in 2015 to just 962 tonnes in 2024, according to data reported in 2026. Only one mine remains in operation, while several projects are still awaiting development.
In other words, mining sovereignty has advanced faster than the country’s industrial and commercial capacity.
The uranium price debate: why the comparison with Orano is misleading
A widely repeated claim compares a supposed ‘French price’ with today’s global market price. That comparison is deceptive.
Uranium does not trade like oil. There is no single exchange setting a daily price at which all producers sell. Contracts are negotiated directly between producers, intermediaries and nuclear utilities, often using formulas that blend spot indices with long-term prices.
Historical data nonetheless offers a useful benchmark.
In 2020, available figures indicated that Niger received roughly 48.1 billion CFA francs for 1,113 tonnes from Cominak and 103.3 billion CFA francs for 1,879 tonnes from Somaïr. For Somaïr, that worked out to about €83.75 per kilogram of uranium, based on calculations using public data from that period.
A separate analysis drawing on EITI data estimated that uranium purchased from Orano had been around 45,000 CFA francs per kilogram in recent years — approximately $33 per pound — while some European or Japanese buyers reportedly paid around 60,000 CFA francs per kilogram.
The market has shifted dramatically since then.
In 2025, the average spot price paid by European utilities was $70.33 per pound, up from $53.59 in 2024. The average price in multi-year contracts, however, was much lower at $54.70 per pound.
By late September 2026, the spot indicator stood around $89.63 per pound, while the long-term price reached roughly $96.50 per pound.
The conclusion matters: Niger now operates in a far more favourable price environment than in the early 2020s. But that does not prove Niamey is actually selling its uranium at $90 or $100 per pound.
This is where the picture becomes opaque.
The $170 million Russian contract that was never confirmed
The most striking case concerns the yellowcake stockpile accumulated at Arlit.
In 2025, several French sources claimed Niamey had reached an agreement with Russia covering 1,000 tonnes of uranium concentrate for about $170 million. If confirmed, that would equate to roughly $170 per kilogram, or nearly $77 per pound.
That price would be below the spot price of late September 2026, but comparable to certain contract levels seen on the international market.
The problem is that neither party has officially confirmed the deal. The Nigerien government denied selling the stock, and Rosatom stated it was not party to the agreement in question.
Yet the matter is not merely a rumour without material evidence.
In November 2025, around 1,000 tonnes of yellowcake were indeed loaded onto trucks at Arlit. About thirty vehicles then travelled to Niamey under military escort. The convoy ultimately became stranded at the capital’s airport.
This is precisely where the grey zone begins.
A physical transfer of that scale does not by itself prove a sale. But it shows that Nigerien authorities were actively working to commercialise the stock.
The $170 million figure should therefore be presented as an allegation documented by several sources — not as an established contract.
Iran: confidential talks that left traces
The Russian file is not the first opaque episode.
In 2024, Le Monde revealed confidential negotiations between Niamey and Tehran over 300 tonnes of yellowcake, valued at an estimated $56 million. Several Western and Nigerien sources confirmed the discussions took place.
The Nigerien government denied concluding a sale. A government adviser nonetheless acknowledged that Iran had wanted to buy the 300 tonnes, explaining that Niamey refused due to a lack of available stock.
Here too, three distinct notions must be separated: negotiation, agreement and executed contract.
The available information establishes that negotiations occurred. It does not prove that a clandestine delivery took place.
Russia and China: new allies or new clients?
Russia is now Niamey’s most visible geopolitical partner in the nuclear sector.
In December 2025, the Nigerien company Timersoi National Uranium Company signed a cooperation agreement with Uranium One Group, a subsidiary of Russia’s Rosatom, to explore deposits and, eventually, develop new mines.
China has also shown interest in the Arlit stockpile. In 2025, sources indicated discussions potentially covering around 1,000 tonnes.
But these new partners do not necessarily guarantee better prices.
What they mainly offer Niger is more negotiating options.
That is a fundamental difference.
Is Niger actually selling its uranium on better terms?
At this stage, the most honest answer is: not yet proven.
Niger now holds three advantages it did not have with the same intensity before.
First, the international uranium price is much higher.
Second, Niamey is seeking to diversify its partners: Russia, China, but also Canadian, Australian and American players.
Third, the government now directly controls a critical part of the mining chain.
But three weaknesses limit this strategy: falling production, logistical problems and legal uncertainty linked to the dispute with Orano.
In September 2025, an ICSID arbitral tribunal also ordered Niger not to sell or transfer to third parties the uranium produced by Somaïr that is subject to the litigation.
Political sovereignty alone is not enough to create a solvent market.
The Nigerien paradox
Niger now wants to sell its uranium ‘at the best price’. But to achieve that, it must produce regularly, transport its ore securely, attract capital and legally guarantee its contracts.
The country is precisely trying to rebuild that capacity. In 2026, it even created the Teloua Safeguarding Uranium Mining Company, intended to replace the nationalised Somaïr. At the same time, new Western investors are returning: in September 2026, the United States approved up to $414 million in financing for the Dasa project of Global Atomic, a Canadian company.
This may be the real turning point.
Niger is not simply replacing France with Russia. It is gradually trying to turn its uranium into a lever of competition between several powers.
For now, however, no public evidence confirms that new contracts bring Niger more than those signed under Orano. International price levels are higher, yes. Negotiating options are more numerous, yes. But the contracts actually signed, their pricing formulas, premiums, logistical costs and the net share returning to the state remain largely opaque.
As for ‘secret contracts’, confidential negotiations and sufficiently serious accusations exist to justify investigations, particularly around Iran and Russia. But speaking of definitively established secret contracts would, to date, go beyond the available evidence.
The real issue for Niamey is therefore no longer just knowing whom to sell its uranium to. It is knowing at what price, with what guarantees, and above all what share of that value will actually remain in Niger.