The Sahel states alliance: why concrete intervention remains elusive in Niger
A year after its charter was formalized and its confederation established, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) – comprising Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger – consistently faces scrutiny regarding its capacity to fulfill its central promise: mutual defense. Amid recent security escalations and significant jihadist attacks impacting Nigerien territory, the noticeable absence of a joint armed intervention has prompted questions among local populations and regional observers. Several structural and strategic factors contribute to this operational inertia on the ground in Niger.
National armies already stretched thin
The primary constraint remains the overburdened nature of the national armed forces. Each member of the alliance confronts intense security threats within its own borders:
- In Mali: The military and its allied forces remain concentrated on asserting control over the northern and central regions, battling against the JIM (Permanent Strategic Framework and Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups).
- In Burkina Faso: More than half of the nation’s territory endures constant pressure from recurring terrorist assaults.
- In Niger: Security forces are tasked with simultaneously safeguarding the Liptako-Gourma region (the tri-border area) against the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM) and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS), while also monitoring the Lake Chad basin.
Given this context, none of the three states possess sufficient strategic reserves to deploy a significant contingent to a neighboring country without compromising their own national security apparatus.
Logistical hurdles for the joint force
While the political decision to unify forces was agreed upon during AES Confederation summits, the practical implementation of this joint force encounters substantial material challenges:
- Interoperability and command: Coordinating disparate military doctrines and establishing an integrated chain of command requires considerable time and robust, secure communication networks.
- Air support and intelligence: Projecting troops over vast distances across the Sahel demands extensive armored transport, resupply capabilities, and aerial intelligence assets (such as drones and combat aviation). These capacities are currently limited and heavily utilized locally by each nation.
The role of external partners
The withdrawal of traditional military forces, notably from France and the UN mission MINUSMA, has led the three military regimes to diversify their alliances, particularly towards Russia through the deployment of the paramilitary Africa Corps. However, these support forces are primarily deployed under bilateral agreements and are not principally mandated to conduct cross-border operations under the AES banner.
A strategic choice favoring intelligence
Beyond large-scale troop deployments, AES authorities highlight an alternative form of cooperation: intelligence sharing and targeted, punctual operations along borders. For the Sahelian military command, intervention does not necessarily manifest as a vast, visible deployment, but rather as coordinated actions within the critical three-borders zone, where each army primarily operates from its own territory.
